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PL IN IFF S REPLY ON REMEDY
Plaintiff seeks an order requiring defendant to offer her
admission to the fir . Defendant questions this Court's
authority to enter such an order and alternatively contends that
such relief should not be granted for equitable reasons.
Defendant s arguments on these points, as well as on the issues
of front pay and mitigation, are unpersuasive. This Court has
the power and the duty to fashion complete relief in this case.
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Lander v.
Lujan, 888 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
I. THERE ARE NO LEGAL BARRIERS TO AN ORDER THAT
PLAINTIFF BE OFFERED PARTNERSHIP
This Court unquestionably has the authority to require Price
Waterhouse to offer plaintiff admission to the firm. The notion
that this relief might be unavailable at common law is
irrelevant, since Congress enacted Title VII exactly because the
common law did not adequately address the problem of
discrimination in employment. Over 20 years ago the Fifth
Circuit rejected the argument that  Title VII must be strictly
construed because it is in derogation of the common law, 
observing:
Whatever efficacy that old bromide  ay have in other
areas of la , it is clearly inapplicable to the
socially remedial statute involved here.
Geor ia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462, 466 n.6 (5th Cir. 1969)
Justice Powell s concurrence in Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U.S. 69 (1989), simply set forth his view that Title VII does
not cover the relationships among partners of a firm. Id. at
79. Justice Powell did not suggest that Federal courts lacked
authority to require ad ission to a firm in the first instance to
one denied admission because of race or sex. Nor is there any
such suggestion in the opinion for the Court.
Price Waterhouse is a huge firm, with so many partners
(about 900) in so many different offices (90-100) that they wear
name tags to identify themselves to one another at the firm's
annual meeting. See 1990 Connor Dep. 10-11, 56; the original of
this deposition is being filed with the Court. Price Waterhouse
is, quite literally, a large farflung commercial enterprise,
national in scope and tied into an even larger worldwide network
through common shareholding in an offshore firm, Price Waterhouse
World Firm Ltd.  /
1/ Mr. Connor is now Chairman of the World Firm. All Price
Waterhouse (U.S.) partners must be shareholders in the World
Firm, w ic  binds together a Price Waterhouse World Organization
that now includes about 2600 partners in 26 operating firms
throughout the world. See 1990 Connor Dep. 5-7, 15.
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Price Waterhouse s size, its profitmaking character, and its
open-ended me bership undermine defendant's arguments based on
freedom of association. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
rejected such contentions even when made by nonprofit
organizations which were principally established for social and
community betterment purposes, when their size and business-
related features brought them within the regulatory-ambit of
state and local antidiscrimination laws that applied to their
membership and guest policies. New Yor  State Club Association
v. City of New York,   U.S.  , 108 S.Ct. 2225 (1988)? Board
of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte,   U.S.  , 107 S.Ct. 1940 (1987) ; Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1987). In Roberts, the Court
pointedly contrasted the intimacy, personal attachment, and
selectivity of family relationships with  an association lacking
these qualities   such as a large business enterprise,  noting
that the latter type of organization  see s remote from the
concerns giving rise to the constitutional protection of
expressive association.  Id. 468 U.S. at 620. It is clear on
this record, moreover, what the main associational interests of
Price Waterhouse partners in one another are:
Q. No , I take it that you have some partne s,
fairly senior ones at that, who are quite har  to work
for or with at times; isn't that so?
A. Maybe occasionally they put me in that
category. Sure. There are demanding people in this
firm just as in other business.
Q.  nd from the viewpoint of a person  ho is in
another office at least in Price Waterhouse, the
primary concerns about the partner in Office A, about
a partner in Office B, that he or she doesn't work
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with much, is w et er that person is a productive
contributing partner to the gro th a d the prestige of
the firm; is that correct?
A.  bsolutely.
1985 Connor Dep. 53.
Ad ission to membership in Price Waterhouse is not
qualitatively different than admission to membership in labor
organizations, which Title VII courts have repeatedly ordered.
See, for example. Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Voqler, 407 f.2d
1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. United Assn, of Journeymen
etc., Local 24, et al., 364 F.Supp. 8 08 (D.N.J. 1973). Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), established that admission
of an employee to partnership in a professional firm much smaller
and less dispersed than Price Waterhouse is within the reach of
Title VII. See also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. at
1781 n.1. If that is so, ma e whole relief must surely include
an order that an employee who was unlawfully denied such
admission be offered what was wrongly withheld.
II. THERE ARE NO EQUITABLE REASONS TO DENY
PLAINTIFF SUCH RELIEF
The fulcrum of this case is Price Waterhouse s decision in
March 1983 to place Ann Hopkins on hold rather than admit her
directly to partnership, as was done for many of her male
cohorts. This Court's original liability determination rested
solely on defendant's March 1983 hold decision; the Court of
Appeals focused only on it in affirming this Court's finding of
liability and in remanding the case for entry of full relief; and
the Supreme Court as well concentrated e clusively on the March
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1983 hold decision. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775,
1781 n.l (1989) ( [w]e are concerned today only with Price
Waterhouse s decision to place Hop ins' candidacy on hold ).
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the
question of proper relief is reached only if the defendant has
first been held liable. 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1783, 1787-1788 n. 10
and accompanying text (1989). Hence the necessary predicate to
discussion of relief is the assumption that defendant has been
found to have violated Title VII in denying plaintiff admission
to partnership and putting her on hold in March 1983. But for
this violation, plaintiff would have been made a partner.
Nonetheless, defendant devotes much of its brief  on
remedial issues  to arguments that later events which would never
have occurred (or would have been immaterial) if plaintiff had
been elected to partnership should be retroactively applied to
deny her partnership now. Specifically, defendant argues at
length in Part l.b of its brief that a conversation which
occurred after March 1983 between plaintiff and Price Waterhouse
partner Donald Epelbaum   and which would never have taken place
if she had been offered partnership originally   justifies
denying her partnership now. Defendant's contention that Mr.
Epelbaum's sense of personal grievance toward plaintiff should
now be deemed sufficient ground to deny her an order that she be
offered partnership in the exercise of the Court's equitable
powers is fanciful. If this were an implied claim that a single
partner at Price Waterhouse can block a candidate for admission
to the firm, the record would refute it. See Tr. 259-262, 273-
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274, 280 (Ziegler); 1985 Connor Dep. 259-262. However, it is not
even that. It is, in effect, a claim t at Mr. Epelbau  could
secure plaintiff s   andatory withdrawal" (i.e., expulsion fro 
partnership), after her admission because he was offended by her
behavior toward him. In fact, only two Price Waterhouse partners
have ever been expelled for reasons other than health, conviction
of a crime, or loss of licensure. One of these was for less-
than-competent performance, and the other was for making
inappropriate charges to the firm; neither was for deficient
interpersonal skills. 1990 Connor Dep. 22-23.
Defendant's claim that the decision of plaintiff's office
not to renominate her for partnership in August 1983 is a
superseding cause  justifying the denial of back pay after that
date is even more fanciful. See Def. Br. 15-16, text and note
16. The necessary predicate of that claim is that plaintiff was
properly placed on  hold  four months earlier, whereas the
necessary predicate of any discussion of relief is exactly the
opposite.
Defendant also suggests that all plaintiff lost in March
1983 was  fair consideration  as a partner candidate, so all she
should be given is a nondiscriminatory re-run of the ad ission
process. -?/ Plaintiff certainly was not considered fairly; that
much is clear fro  the Supreme Court's affirmance of this Court's
2J How this could be accomplished today, seven years later,
is not explained. See Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, 51
FEP Cases 815, 836 (1st Cir. 1989) (reguiring that plaintiff be
awarded tenure rather than just being  subjected to a non¬
discriminatory tenure decision ).
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factual determina ions. But a finding of liability means that
the unfairness cost her admission to the firm. Given that, full
relief should include what was denied.
III. IF THE COURT WERE TO ORDER FRONT PAY INSTEAD OF
ADMISSION TO PARTNERSHIP, THAT RELIEF MUST ALSO
MAKE PLAINTIFF WHOLE UNDER SETTLED PRINCIPLES
Assu ing that for some unique reason plaintiff s denial of
partnership should not be remedied by an order requiring her
admission, then monetary relief in the form of front pay is
required. Even at common law, a successful plaintiff is not
denied relief altogether if a court declines to order specific
performance; instead he gets money damages. -5/ As we have shown,
apart from the preference for placement rather than damages, the
same principle applies under Federal EEO statutes, including
cases cited by defendant which denied reinstatement. See Cassino
v. Reichold Chemicals Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 785 (1988) ( an award of future da ages
or  front pay  in lieu of reinstatement furthers the remedial
goals of the ADEA by returning the aggrieved party to the
economic situation he would have enjoyed but for the defendant s
illegal conduct ); EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420
F.Supp. 919, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.),
cert, denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977). See also Whittlesey v. Union
Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-29 (2d Cir. 1984) (ADEA);
J See Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 5A (1964), § 1136 at 96
( [d]amages, restitution and specific enforcement are merely
three remedies within the court's power to give; and it awards
the one that seems most effective to do full justice . . . ).
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Fitz erald v. Sirloin Stoc ade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th
Cir. 1980) (Title VII).
There is nothing novel about compensating an individual for
di inished earning capacity over the course of a career. This is
a familiar feature of relief in tort cases in which a physical
injury caused by a defendant makes it unlikely that an individual
will henceforth receive what otherwise would have b en earned
during his working life. In Jones & Lau hlin Steel Corp. v.
Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983), a case arising under the
Longshoremen s and Harbor Workers  Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
904, the Supreme Court devoted most of its opinion to e plaining
just how such a remedy should be computed. The principles set
forth are of general applicability. See Patterson v. American
Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429
U.S. 920 (1976).
Initially, the Supreme Court observed in Pfeifer that
[t]he lost [income] stream's length cannot be  no n
with certainty * * * Given the complexity of trying to
ake an exact calculation, litigants frequently follo 
the relatively simple course of assuming that the
worker would have continued to work up until a
specific date certain.
Id. at 533-34.
In Pfeifer the parties assumed that the plaintiff would have
worked until norma? retirement age, or another 12 1/2 years.
This is just what plaintiff assumes in the present case, i.e.,
that she would continue working as a partner at Price Waterhouse
until she reached the firm's scheduled and normal retirement age
of 60 (another 15 years). See 1990 Connor Dep. 67-68. In
addition, the Court in Pfeifer stated that  fringe benefits . . .
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should be included in an ideal evaluation of the worker s
losses.  Id. at 534. Defendant's most significant fringe
benefit is a retirement plan, and plaintiff has included that in
her analysis of future earnings loss.
The proj ection of lost income is of course an estimate;
absolute precision is not required:
[B]y its very nature the calculation of an a ar  for
lost ea nings must be a rough a proximation. Because
the lost stream [of income] can never be predicted
with complete confidence, any lump sum represents only
a  rough and ready  effort to put the plaintiff in the
position he would have been in had he not been
injured.
Id. at 546.
We stress that front pay is an alternative remedy; it is not
what plaintiff is entitled or what she see s in the first
instance. Admission to partner is the preferred relief for her
individually and as a more general legal matter. See Cassino,
817 F.2d at 1346 ( reinstatement is the preferred remedy in these
cases ). If plaintiff is not offered admission to the firm,
however, she is entitled to full relief in the form of front pay,
and there is nothing novel about her approach in calculating
front pay here.
IV. DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
EXERCISE REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN MITIGATING HER INJURY
As has already been noted, mitigation is an issue as to
which defendant bears the burden of proof. The proof will show,
however, that plaintiff cannot be faulted for her past diligence.
Specifically, it will show that Price Waterhouse itself has never
admitted to partnership someone who had been denied partnership
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in anot er  Big 8" firm, 1990 Connor Dep. 15-18; that neither
defendant nor the placement consultant it no  uses to assist
leaving partners and m nagers h s any record of such   firm as
defendant (and its Big 8 counterparts) hirin , much less makin 
partner, persons who have filed publicized discrimination
complaints against their previous employers, 1990 Connor Dep. 18-
19 and Redford Dep. 25-28; that Price Waterhouse never offered
placement services to plaintiff, although it probably was using
them in 1984 when she left the firm, 1990 Connor Dep. 50-53; that
plaintiff s current position at the World Ban  pays better than
any job defendant can prove was available to her after she left
Price Waterhouse;   and that in the years i mediately after she
left Price Waterhouse and was self-employed plaintiff earned an
average of nearly $57,000 per year, whereas her last salary at
Price Waterhouse was about $65,000. Again, defendant will not be
abie to prove that plaintiff could have earned significantly more
than she in fact earned or that her efforts lacked diligence.
It is also clear that plaintiff never took herself out of
the labor market, e.g., stopped work altogether, returned to
school, pursued a hobby; so defendant's claim that her failure to
mitigate is a bar to recovery of any backpay is without legal
basis. See Brady v. Thurston Motor Line, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269
(4th Cir. 1985). The most telling point is that when her
consulting business began to falter, plaintiff obtained the job
4/ As an American citizen, plaintiff passed  hrough the
needle's eye by obtaining that job; good Dobs at the World Bank
are extremely hard for American citizens to obtain.
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she now holds, which pays substantially better than the $80,000-
level typical senior manager salary today at Price Waterhouse.
See 1990 Connor Dep. 14 .
Finally, we address briefly defendant s suggestion that
plaintiff should have searched the nation for jobs co parable to
her last one at Price Waterhouse. See Def. Br. 18. The evidence
will show that she did look outside of Washington, but she was
not under any duty to do so. See the cases cited at page 15 of
plaintiff's original brief on relief. Her experience, expertise
and best contacts were here. Her husband's business was here,
her children's schools were here. These are reasons which Price
Waterhouse itself accepts as valid grounds for its partners to
refuse to move to other cities. Moreover, it is clear that
defendant does not require its partners, or even its senior
managers, to move, no  atter how strongly it wishes they would do
so. Frequently it offers economic incentives to encourage such
moves, but when the carrot fails, there is no stic . There is,
at worst, a possibility of smaller future increases in
compensation. See 1990 Connor Dep. 38-49.
CONCLUSION
A finding of liability means that defendant violated Title
VII when it placed plaintiff's partnership candidacy on hold in
March 1983 and refused to offer her admission to the firm. Full
relief should include an offer of partnership, which this Court
has authority to require. Front pay is an alternative, less
preferred remedy; but if that alternative is turned to, it, too,
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must be relief which makes the plaintiff whole. Co plete relief
should in any event also include bac  pay and attorneys  fees.
Respectfully submitted,
KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER
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